Emerging Issues: The Underlying Economics of the South China Sea Conflict by Stock, Christopher
University of Baltimore Journal of International Law
Volume 3
Issue 1




Emerging Issues: The Underlying Economics of the
South China Sea Conflict
Christopher Stock
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil
Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stock, Christopher (2014) "Emerging Issues: The Underlying Economics of the South China Sea Conflict," University of Baltimore




THE UNDERLYING ECONOMICS OF THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA CONFLICT 
Christopher Stock* 
The countries of southeastern Asia and China are currently in a 
territorial dispute over the Spratly and Paracel island chains in the 
South China Sea.  The South China Sea encompasses roughly 1.4 
million square miles of the Pacific Ocean, spanning throughout most 
of southeastern Asia.1  A majority of the islands located within the sea 
are uninhabited and have never had an indigenous population, which 
makes it nearly impossible to track the lineage to determine 
sovereignty over the islands.  Because there has never been an 
indigenous population on a majority of the islands, there are now 
competing claims for many of the same pieces of land.2 
There are four main territorial disputes at issue: (1) China claims 
the “nine-dash line”  area, which encompasses the southern province 
of Hainan, the Paracel island chain,  and Spratly island chain; (2) 
Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly island chains; 
(3) the Philippines claim the Spratly islands based on their 
geographical proximity to the chain; (4) Malaysia and Brunei claim 
territory they believe to be in their economic exclusion zones, as laid 
out by the United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).3  
The purpose of this paper will be to examine the underlying economics 
behind the fisheries, shipping lanes, and natural resources highlighting 
South China Sea’s role in the industrialization of Asia. 
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Ambiguity of UNCLOS 
Each country in southeastern Asia is making legal claims for the 
disputed archipelagoes within the South China Sea.  China is claiming 
the most land, the nine-dash line area, which consumes nearly all of 
the South China Sea.4  China believes they have a right to the area 
based on their survey expeditions, fishing activities, and naval patrols, 
which allegedly date back to the fifteenth century.5  Under the 
UNCLOS agreement, which China rejects, each littoral state is allowed 
to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone of 320 km, or a continental 
shelf, around their island.6  Under the UNCLOS guidelines, China’s 
nine-dash line area claim would be invalid. 
Unfortunately, the UNCLOS guidelines are not clear in defining 
island boundaries because there are an additional twelve kilometers of 
territory that can be included in the country’s geography based on 
different aquatic features.7  UNCLOS also fails to specifically state 
what happens when an island lies in multiple countries’ territory.  
Although it may seem UNCLOS would solve the dispute by laying 
specific boundaries for each country, instead, UNCLOS further 
complicates the dispute between the countries.  The ambiguity of 
UNCLOS has opened the door for China to intimidate and dominate 
these smaller island nations.  Through its size and vast economy, China 
is able to control the South China Sea in regards to fishing, shipping, 
and natural resources. 
The Fisheries 
Fishing is an integral part to the economies of southeastern Asia 
and China. Nearly 1.5 billion people live along the border of the South 
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China Sea and rely on fishing for food and income.8  The fishing zone 
in the South China Sea ranks fourth out of the nineteen fisheries around 
the world in total maritime production.9  The area regularly produces 
approximately 10% of the worldwide commercial fishing catch.10  
However, the unregulated fishing in the waters around the Paracel and 
Spratly archipelagoes is quickly depleting fish populations and 
destroying plant and reef life.11  The depleted fish populations have 
forced fishermen to take longer trips and travel farther from their 
homes in search of fish.  The competition between countries for the 
most valuable fisheries has led to more clashing between foreign 
fishing boats.  Many countries, in particular China, have been placing 
annual bans and have been arresting foreign fishermen in waters they 
believe to be their own.12  By taking these actions against foreign 
fishermen, China is indirectly asserting sovereign control over the 
area.13  In a recent fishing dispute, a Chinese boat struck a Vietnamese 
boat, causing the boat to eventually sink.14 
These conflicts have the potential to deter fishermen from the 
South China Sea, many of whom have no other skills.  If this trend 
continues, the economies of the region would undoubtedly suffer 
because the region relies so heavily on fishing as the foundation of the 
economy. 
The Shipping Lanes 
The South China Sea serves as a corridor for much of the world’s 
shipping, thus, it is essential to China, southeastern Asia, and the world 
for this territorial dispute to be resolved in order to ensure free 
navigation.  The reason this area is of paramount importance is 
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because, of the top ten shipping ports in the world, more than half are 
located there, and nearly fifty percent of all oil tankers pass through 
this region.15  There are roughly one and a half billion people who live 
within 100 miles of the South China Sea, and the volume of shipping 
through the South China Sea has greatly increased due to the 
developing industrial economies of the countries within the region.16  
China’s coast, bordering the South China Sea, has become 
significantly more urban, thus giving rise to even more traffic.17  
Assuming these countries will continue to grow economically, the 
shipping lanes have the potential to become an escalating part of the 
issue threatening the economic stability of the region. 
If China were to take control of the South China Sea and impede 
travel through the region, the impact would be felt worldwide.  This 
imposition would have severe economic consequences adversely 
affecting the essential principle of free navigation. Free navigation is 
paramount to ensure the most efficient outcome is reached when 
trading and shipping internationally.  Without free navigation, the 
price of many necessary goods, in particular oil, would skyrocket in 
price due to re-routing and other inefficiencies arising from the 
nuisance.18  However, because free navigation is such a vital 
component of the global economy, it seems unlikely that a country 
would interfere with free navigation because it would also have an 
undesirable effect on their economy. 
The Natural Resources 
The South China Sea is rich with natural resources, and so the 
competitive interests between the countries have landed the sea’s 
hydrocarbons at the crux of the dispute.  The South China Sea has yet 
to be exploited to the extent of many of the world’s other natural 
resource locations, and therefore, remains relatively untapped.19  One 
report by the World Bank estimates that in the South China Sea there 
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are nine hundred trillion cubic feet of natural gas and oil reserves, 
equivalent to at least seven billion barrels.20  The vast amount of natural 
resources available to the region has the potential to allow the 
economies of the smaller nations of southeastern Asia to industrialize 
and prosper.  If smaller countries like Vietnam and the Philippines 
were able to share in the profits from the natural resources, this could 
have the potential to jumpstart their industry, and invigorate their 
economies.  The area in southeastern Asia is already booming, and 
parts of southeastern Asia are going through an industrial revolution.21  
The additional revenue from natural resources could help move along 
industrialization and ensure economic stability in the region. 
The hydrocarbons within the South China Sea are also valuable to 
China.  As China’s economy continues to grow and expand, the natural 
resources in the area could provide the stability necessary to support 
their vast industrialization.22  Chinese energy companies have already 
started drilling in the disputed waters; in 2012, China’s National 
Energy Administration named the South China Sea as a major source 
for China’s natural gas production.23  Although there is much 
discontent and hostility among the smaller southeastern Asian nations 
against China, the disparity of economic and political capital leaves 
little chance for negotiating fair terms to the region’s hydrocarbons. 
Conclusion 
The basic economics underlying the entire conflict is the necessity 
of resources to facilitate industrialization in fisheries, shipping lanes, 
and hydrocarbons, of which the South China Sea is an integral part of 
that development.24  China has been able to harass and bully their way 
into controlling the South China Sea because the countries of 
southeastern Asia have insufficient resources to properly compete.  
China’s ultimate goal is to force the disorganized,, smaller, 
southeastern Asian countries into recognizing its claim to the area.  The 
best chance at a resolution to the South China Sea conflict would be 
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for Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and the other smaller 
southeastern Asian countries to combine economic resources to rival 
that of China’s.  Although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) exists, it lacks the necessary organization and consolidated 
nature to stand up to China.25  ASEAN’s economic and political 
resources are inadequate to unite the people of the region under one 
centralized influential organization.26  Thus, in order for ASEAN to be 
a successful organization and an imposing force within the region, 
ASEAN needs “to define clearer mandates, establish closer 
coordination, and mobilize greater resources.”27  Until there is 
communication and unity between the smaller southeastern Asian 
nations, China will be able to impose their own economic agenda over 
the South China Sea. 
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